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CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE. By Robert Wyness Millar. New York: The Law Center
of New York University for The National Conference of Judicial Coun-
cils. 1952. Pp. xvi, 534. $7.50.
Here is a procedure text which excites my wholehearted enthusiasm.
Had I not known what to expect from its distinguished author, I should
have been frightened by the title; it suggests a combination of two influ-
ences in procedure pedagogy-history and the broad survey-which despite
their virtues nevertheless serve to kill off realistic knowledge of modem
courts. But the book is what the title promises. It is present-day pro-
cedure seen in historical perspective and seen as a whole, but with the
appropriate balance to avoid engulfment by either the temporal or the
territorial sweep. And we are all indebted in consequence for a work
which is at once scholarly and practical.
Careful study of this text impresses one the more with its range. This
is not a large volume as legal texts go. Yet its scope is truly amazing.
Part I is a brilliant, concise essay on procedural evolution from its early
beginnings in Anglo-Saxon law and on the course of reform in both
England and the United States. Part II, the larger portion of the book,
deals with specific phases of the law of civil procedure; its twenty chapters
range from "Conjunct Administration of Law and Equity," i.e., the union
of law and equity, through the commencement of suit, joinder of parties,
pleading, pre-trial and discovery, trial, the jury, and the judgment, down
to execution of judgments and attachments. On each of these topics the
treatment is far from cut and dried. The historical analysis, while
succinct, is unusually stimulating in its orientation and in the perspective
it gives to the modern principles. And the detailed exposition is not
merely informative-it is that to a surprising degree; it is also critical
and creative. With the author's background as an historian, one could well
have expected the scholastic expert's usual nostalgia for the past. But
on the contrary, the book is refreshing in its call for more and greater
reform. Wholly admirable is the deft and sure way in which many a
pleading icon is overthrown-the formal attack on the complaint (the
"demurrer"), the "facts constituting the cause of action," the limitations
on summary judgment, and all the other paralyzing dogmas of the past
and, unfortunately, the present. A single example: "No chapter in the
history of the American codes is more conspicuous for jejune dialectic
than that relating to the present matter [the exclusion of inconsistent
defenses]" (p. 181).
It is impossible in a short review to convey adequately the flavor of
this skillful blending of the past and present with an eye on the future.
Since his critique of the latest and most modern systems is especially
intriguing, I shall discuss that as a means of savoring the whole. Worthy
of note is the fact that the author has studied the original drafts for the
Federal Rules, and in several instances expresses regret that these, or
suggestions in them, did not prevail. They include such matters as the
manner of instituting suit and the service of process and the original
form of the rule for amendments to conform to the proof. Since I
worked through all this and in general sympathize with the author's
views and criticisms, I cannot avoid some melancholy thoughts of what
might have been. But reflection tells me that this is not the entire story.
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The goal of mythical perfection had to be tempered to minimize the strong
resentment of lawyers who were not prepared for so extensive a change.
Certain compromises were desirable to promote both the spirit and the
fact of uniformity. In retrospect I do not think those were great or too
high a price to pay for the very wide support the rules have had. This
aspect I think the author has overlooked-perhaps intentionally-in his
call for greater accomplishment. A view to further progress is certainly
desirable despite-or possibly even to counterbalance-occasional retro-
gressive attacks on the rules, well illustrated-by the recent Pacific Coast
plea for a return to alleging the facts of the cause of action.'
This particular issue might receive a bit more of our attention, since
the author's critique of the present rule's caution well illustrates the
point I would make. The rules represent essentially a middle position
based on the best common-law precedents steadily in use in the more
moderate and successful code states.2 What the Western lawyers want
is none too clear; they rather seem to have been influenced by some
indiscriminate criticisms looking to the stricter procedure of only a few
states and even there not consistently applied. 3 But their clamor does
illustrate the shock of lawyers at what is feared, no matter how erron-
eously, to be new. One can imagine their horror at the author's reasoned
and fairly persuasive conclusion (p. 193) that "[t]he solution, we think,
is to be found in the frank and unqualified acceptance ... of the prin-
ciple that, so far as regards the statement of facts, no more should be
asked of a pleading than that it give adequate notice of the claim or
defense." While I can see nothing but confusion in the Western proposal,
I still do think there is much to be said for the fair compromise of the
rules. The present rule is in line with traditional habits of most well-
informed lawyers and has thus proved its practicability; the pleading it
envisages does give a considerable amount of valuable information for
the case itself, for selection of the mode of trial, and for recognition and
enforcement of the principle of res judicata; and the rule's comparative
leniency avoids undue burdens and waste.4 These advantages are to be
weighed against the complete indefiniteness of the seemingly attractive
1. The Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference has proposed as an amendment to the
provision of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) that the complaint shall contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief" the
further words "which statement shall contain the facts constituting the cause of
action." REP. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U. S. 23 (Sept. 22-24, 1952). I have dis-
cussed this proposition somewhat more fully in my forthcoming review of VANDER-
BILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
(1952), in 62 YALE L. J ......... (1953).
2. So Federal Form 9, "Complaint for Negligence," was taken from the Massa-
chusetts statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 231, §147, p. 2892 (1932), and is the common-
law declaration in trespass on the case. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131
Eng. Rep. 848 (C. P. 1833) ; Reichwein v. United Electric Rys. Co., 68 R.I. 365, 27
A.2d 845 (1942). See also Federal Forms 4-8 and the "common counts"; Cook,
"Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. OF CHI. L. Rzv. 233, 245 (1937) ; Notes, 30
CALIF. L. REV. 585 (1942), and 4 id. 352 (1916); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 287-296
(2d ed. 1947).
3. See e.g., City of Logansport v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68, 64 N.E. 595 (1902);
Frosch v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 300, 199 Atl. 646 (1938) ; Terner v. Glick-
stein & Terner, Inc., 283 N.Y. 299, 28 N.E.2d 846 (1940); see also CLARK, CASES
ON MODERN PLEADING cc. 2, 3 (1952).
4. See general discussion in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 225-245 (2d ed. 1947) ; Clark,
Simplified Pleading, A.B.A. Jun. ADM. MONOGRAPHS (Ser. A, No. 18), also re-
printed in 2 F.R.D. 456, 27 IOWA L. REv. 272 (1942), and 1942 HANDBOOK NAT.
CONF. JuD. COUNCILS 136; see also the review in 62 YALE L. J'. ....., note 1 supra.
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admonition of mere "notice." Even the author's objective in supporting
(pp. 195-200) a proposal by a City Bar Committee in New York for"a single statement of the transaction or facts, followed by a statement
of the various legal theories upon which he claims to be entitled to recover
under those facts," seems more substantially, if more traditionally,
achieved in the formula of the rules.
In this connection the author's condemnation of the demurrer-whose
return in some form would be a necessary concomitant to any real retreat
to "the facts" of the "cause of action"-while wholly admirable, does
not, I think, necessarily point to the superiority of the English Rules over
American counterparts. Here, too, the Federal Rules had to go slowly,
and to take some note of professional nostalgias. And particularly by
virtue of the amendments of 1948, the difference in the procedures is now
rather small. Notable among the recent changes was the amendment of
Rule 12(b) turning the former motion to dismiss on the pleadings into
a motion for summary judgment on the merits at the desire of any party
unless affirmatively checked-as it is not in practice-by the trial judge.
This revised rule seems to be working quite along the lines the author
urges.5 We are grateful for his clear-sighted perception of the course
that improvement should take.
What I have said on this one interesting point conveys, I hope, some-
thing of the width of view, the background of experience and history,
which the author brings to his task. The discussion here given emphasis
is, after all, only a dozen or so pages-a slight part of the total, and yet
a complete unit in itself. Other examples could be multiplied. But this
affords an illustration of the economy with which the author treats a
confusing and ordinarily compartmentalized subject. And there is good
writing; last but by no means least, the book is interesting to read.
CHARLES E. CLARK*
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE. By George W. Stocking and
Myron W. Watkins. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1951.
Pp. xv, 596. $4.00.
The plan of the Twentieth Century Fund's impressive survey, Mono-
poly and Free Enterprise, follows the pattern of many congressional
committee reports. The bulk of the work was written by the research
staff, headed by George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. Their
findings (Chs. 1-15) provide a background for the Report and Recom-
mendations of the Fund's Committee on Cartels and Monopoly (Ch. 16).YL
In view of the fact that the chairman and three other members of the
Committee have annotated the report with occasional notes of individual
disagreement, it is fair to surmise that the synthesis of the Committee's
views was also prepared by the staff.
To appraise a committee report fairly, it is necessary to know some-
thing about the record on which the report is based-what witnesses were
5. See cases cited in CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING 400-404 (1952), and
Clark, Experience under the Amendments to the Federal Riles of Civil Procedure,
in FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND NEw TITLE 28, U. S. CODE JUDICIARY
AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE: 1, 6, 14, 24 (West Pub. Co., rev. ed. 1952).
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. The Committee included the following members: James M. Landis (Chair-
man), A. S. Goss, Marion Hedges, Donald M. Nelson, Frank M. Surface, Jacob
Viner, and J. Raymond Walsh.
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